Atari Games v. Nintendo: Does a Closed System Violate the Antitrust Laws by Lunney, Glynn S., Jr
Texas A&M University School of Law 
Texas A&M Law Scholarship 
Faculty Scholarship 
3-1989 
Atari Games v. Nintendo: Does a Closed System Violate the 
Antitrust Laws 
Glynn S. Lunney Jr 
Texas A&M University School of Law, glunney@law.tamu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Glynn S. Lunney Jr, Atari Games v. Nintendo: Does a Closed System Violate the Antitrust Laws, 5 High 
Tech. L.J. 29 (1989). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/facscholar/489 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Texas A&M Law Scholarship. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Texas A&M Law Scholarship. For more 
information, please contact aretteen@law.tamu.edu. 
COMMENT
ATARI GAMES V. NINTENDO: DOES A CLOSED
SYSTEM VIOLA TE THE ANTITRUST LAWS?
BY GLYNN S. LUNNEY, JR.t
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INTRODUCTION
As I rushed through the malls this past Christmas, I noticed a new
store, one that would not have been possible just a few years ago. It was
a Nintendo boutique. I was permitted only to gaze longingly at the
games and accessories on display before being pulled away to shop for
the things I would actually buy, but I thought it would be fun to return
someday and purchase the system and perhaps a few cartridges and
accessones.
So, I must admit that my perspective on the Atari v. Nintendo1 suits
will not be that of an unaffected observer, but rather that of a potential
© 1990 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.
t Candidate for J.D. 1990, Stanford Law School. B.S. Petroleum Engineering, 1984,
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consumer. Like millions2 of others, I am directly concerned with the price
and quality of the cartridges that are available for play on the Nintendo
system.
As a consumer, what should I think of the allegations by Tengen
and its parent, Atari Games, that Nintendo has been artificially restricting
the supply of games through the use of a lock-out chip?3 Should I be
convinced by Nintendo's response that the lock-out chip ensures that
each game I buy will be of the highest quality?
4
As a lawyer, I should also find the answers to these two questions
important. Courts have noted that the antitrust laws are designed to
protect competition and the consumer. 5 Therefore, the answers to the
consumer's questions should largely answer the question of whether the
lock-out chip and Nintendo's ancillary licensing practices violate the
antitrust laws.
To analyze these issues, I will discuss the background facts and the
nature of Nintendo's patent and its licensing practices in Section I. In
Section II, I will discuss the economic effects of the patent and licensing
system and how they might or might not enhance societal wealth. In
Section III, I will discuss the results of Section II in terms of the legal
analysis that the courts have employed in considering alleged antitrust
Law Journal Comment Competition. The competition was sponsored by the law firms of
Cooley Godward Castro Huddleson & Tatum, Fenwick, Davis & West, Ware &
Freidenrich, and Wilson, Sonsini, Goodrich & Rosati. The author would like to thank
Professor William F. Baxter and Leslie A. Lunney for their help and support.
1. There are three suits involved: two between Atari Games Corp. and Nintendo that
have been consolidated: Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. (N.D. Cal. filed Dec.
12, 1988) (No. C-88-4805-FMS) and Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Tengen, Inc. (N.D. Cal. filed
Feb. 2, 1989) (No. C-89-0027-FMS) (Tengen is a wholly owned subsidiary of Atari Games
Corp.); and one suit between Atari Corporation (not formally related to Atari Games
Corp.) and Nintendo: Atari Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 30, 1989) (No.
C-89-0824-FMS), cited in Abramson, Atari v. Nintendo, Another Collision of Patent and
Antitrust Policies, THE COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1989, at 24, 29 n.1. Atari Games produces
primarily game software and its subsidiary, Tengen, Inc., produces Nintendo
Entertainment System (NES)-compatible game cartridges under license from Nintendo.
This analysis focuses primarily on the Atari Games v. Nintendo suits.
2. According to one source, Nintendo Entertainment Systems will be in place in 19
million homes by the end of 1989. See Shao, Dunkin & Cole, There's a Rumble in the
Videogame Arcade, Bus. WK., Feb. 20, 1989, at 37, 37 [hereinafter Rumble in the Arcade].
3. See Second Amended and Supplemental Complaint at 5-6, Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc. (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 7, 1988) (No. C-88-4805-FMS) [hereinafter
Atari's Complaint].
4. Cf. First Amended Complaint at 6, Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Tengen, Inc. (N.D. Cal.
filed Feb. 2, 1989) (No. C-89-0027-FMS) [hereinafter Nintendo's Complaint].
5. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977);
Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 732 F.2d 1403, 1408 (9th
Cir. 1984).
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violations. Finally, in Section IV, I will conclude with some thoughts on
how a consumer might view these practices.
I. THE NINTENDO CRAZE
A. The History of Home Videogames
The Nintendo Entertainment System (NES) is not the first system
intended to bring the excitement of the videogame arcade into the living
rooms of America. 6 The NES spearheads the second such attempt. To
understand Nintendo's behavior in structuring its foray into the
American market, it is helpful to review the first such attempt.
7
The first attempt began sometime in the late 1970s and reached a
peak in 1983 with $3 billion in sales.8 Two years later home videogame
sales had plunged to $100 million.9 Nintendo, and others, attribute the
fall to "a flood of cheap, poor-quality game cartridges." 10 This statement
implies that the first foray into home videogames failed due to some
combination of a lack of profit in production and distribution because of
low prices caused by the very competition that the antitrust laws are
designed to foster, and a lack of demand by the consuming public
because the game cartridges were of poor quality.1
A second and more probable reason for the fall is that the original
machines and software were simply not up to the quality of arcade
machines, or that of the NES.12 Thus, it was not that the game cartridge
was of poor quality. Rather, it was that even a good quality cartridge,
containing software that fully used the original base unit's capabilities,
became boring rather quickly.
13
6. Adler, Rogers, Brailsford, Gordon & Quade, The Nintendo Kid, NEWSWK., Mar. 6, 1989,
at 64, 66 [hereinafter The Kid]; McGill, A Nintendo Labyrinth Filled with Lawyers, Not
Dragons, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 3 [hereinafter Labyrinth].
7. Nintendo claims that it is trying to avoid the pitfalls which waylaid the first attempt.
See, e.g., Rogers, The Other Guys: Zapped or Be Zapped, NEWSWK., Mar. 6, 1989, at 66, 66
[hereinafter Zapped]; Labyrinth, supra note 6.
8. See, e.g., The Kid, supra note 6, at 66.
9. See id.
10. Rumble in the Arcade, supra note 2, at 37; see also Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4,
at 5-6, ("Stores ultimately became flooded with low quality, poorly performing video
game cartridges which led to massive consumer disenchantment, plummeting demand
and unsaleable game inventories.").
11. One source even suggests that demand curves are not uniformly downward
sloping and that low prices alone can reduce demand. See Labyrinth, supra note 6, at D23,
col. 5 (quoting Sean McGowan, analyst, Balis Zorn Gerard).
12. Cf. Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 5.
13. Cf. The Kid, supra note 6, at 66 ("Sales for the whole industry...fell to $100 million [in
19851, by which time virtually every kid owned a video game and had exhausted its
limited repertoire of tricks.").
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Despite the collapse of the first attempt, in 1985 Nintendo began to
test the American market with its more sophisticated machine, the NES.
To avoid a glut of game cartridges, Nintendo installed a lock-out chip in
its base unit and in each cartridge. Use of the lock-out system means that
only game cartridges specifically created for use with the NES will work
with the NES2 4 To ensure an adequate supply of games, Nintendo has
licensed 36 software producers to create games for its system15 and
currently has over 100 titles.1 6
Sales of the NES in the United States have increased steadily each
year, giving Nintendo 74% of an estimated $2.3 billion in sales in the
United States' home videogame market in 1988.17 Nintendo projects sales
in the market to reach $3.4 billion in 1989, with Nintendo having a 77%
share. 1
8
B. Nintendo's Patent and Its Licensing Practices
In 1985 Katsuya Nakagawa applied for, and in 1989, was granted a
patent for the lock-out system used on the NES2 9 Nakagawa assigned
the patent to Nintendo Co. Ltd., the parent company of Nintendo of
America, Inc.20 The patent covers only the lock-out system itself.21 The
patent does not cover the base unit or the game cartridges, or the
combination of the two to create home videogames.
To create the lock-out system, Nintendo starts with a lock-out
microprocessor and a program. 22 This pair is placed into the circuitry of
both the base unit and the cartridge. When the cartridge is inserted into
the base unit, the lock-out microprocessors exchange a timed sequence of
signals. If the timing and the signals match those the lock-out
microprocessors have been programmed to receive, the base unit will
load and run the game stored on the cartridge. If the signals stop or fail
to match, then the game stops.
23
14. In computer systems, when the software for a computer is only available from the
hardware manufacturer, the system is referred to as a closed system.
15. Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 6; see also Rumble in the Arcade, supra note 2,
at 37 ("34 licensees"); Labyrinth, supra note 6, at D23, col. 2 ("39 software development
companies in the United States and Japan"); Schmitt, Atari Tests Technology's Antitrust
Aspect, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1988, at B8, col. 3 ("about 30 software companies").
16. See Zapped, supra note 7, at 67.
17. See Rumble in the Arcade, supra note 2, at 37.
18. Id.
19. See Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 21; see also Abramson, supra note 1, at 24,
25, 29 n.11.
20. See Abramson, supra note 1, at 29 n.11.
21. Id. at 26.
22. Id. at 25.
23. See Atari's Complaint, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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In addition to the patent on the lock-out system, Nintendo also
claims copyright protection for the program that runs the
microprocessors and for the timed sequence of signals that the
programmed microprocessors generate.
24
Prior to December 1988, a software producer that wanted to publish
games for the NES had to take a license from Nintendo.25 No one had
broken the lock-out system, and only Nintendo-manufactured cartridges
would work with the NES. The form license: (i) requires licensees to
market the programmed cartridge under the Nintendo trademark, (ii)
restricts the number of titles that each licensee can publish in a year, (iii)
gives Nintendo unilateral control over how many cartridges of each title a
licensee can sell, (iv) prohibits sales of the resulting product outside the
United States, and (v) prohibits licensees from converting NES-
compatible games to run on competitors' machines for a period of two
years (the exclusive outlet restriction).
26
The situation changed in late 1988, when Atari Games announced
that it had "reverse engineered" the lock-out device and began shipping
NES-compatible game cartridges programmed by its subsidiary Tengen
to toy stores throughout the United States.27 At virtually the same time,
Atari Games sued Nintendo alleging that Nintendo's lock-out system and
its licensing practices violated the antitrust laws.
28
Nintendo responded by suing Tengen (Atari Games' subsidiary)
alleging violations of the Lanham Act, violations of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, breach of contract, and
unfair competition. Nintendo has since amended its complaint to add a
cause of action for patent infringement. 29 Atari Corporation (not formally
related to Atari Games Corporation) has also filed an antitrust action
24. See id. at 10.
25. See Answer to Second Amended Complaint at 4, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
Am., Inc. (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 23, 1989) (No. C-88-4805-FMS).
26. See Atari's Complaint, supra note 3, at 7-8. Nintendo admits in its answers that the
licenses do contain these restrictions. Answer to Second Amended Complaint at 4, Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., (N.D. Cal. filed Oct. 23, 1989) (No. C-88-4805-FMS).
The court relied on four terms of the license agreement in enjoining Nintendo from
initiating patent infringement lawsuits against retailers marketing Atari Game's
compatible cartridges: prohibition on sales outside the United States; the exclusive outlet
provision; the requirement that a licensee buy the programmed cartridge from Nintendo;
and the output restriction on titles. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part
Preliminary Injunction at 4-5, Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Tengen, Inc. (N.D. Cal. March 9,
1989) (No. C-89-0027-FMS). For a more complete description of the license terms, see
Abramson, supra note 1, at 24.
27. See, e.g., Abramson, supra note 1, at 24; Labyrinth, supra note 6, at D23, col. 3.
28. Complaint, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 12,
1988) (No. C-88-4805-FMS), cited in Abramson, supra note 1, at 29 n.1.
29. Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 21-22. The court found this case and the
Atari Games case related and the proceedings have been joined.
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against Nintendo 3 ° In addition, a United States congressman has
suggested that the Justice Department investigate Nintendo's practices
for potential antitrust violations.
31
Nintendo has justified the licensing practices and the use of a closed
system by pointing to the collapse of the first home videogame market.
"It was the only way we could assure that there would be consistent,
quality software. We made a choice and it turns out that our choice was
the correct one, to achieve the kind of success that we have."
32
The decision was clearly a success for Nintendo, but that success
may be at the expense of consumers. The next section considers this
possibility by examining the likely economic effects of Nintendo's actions
on the ordinary consumer.
II. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE PRACTICES
This section will begin by introducing the basic framework for
economic analysis of antitrust issues. Once introduced, the framework
will be applied to analyze the economics involved in three specific areas:
the closed system, the specific licensing practices, and the patent. While
this analysis will be somewhat superficial, the results will point to the
questions that a court will need to answer to determine whether
Nintendo's actions violate the antitrust laws. This analysis indicates that
the patent on the lock-out system does not affect the determination of the
antitrust question. Indeed, the analysis indicates that the patent is
irrelevant to deciding the antitrust issues; the legality of using the patent
to create the closed system depends entirely on whether the closed
system is an antitrust violation.
A. The Economic Harm of a Monopoly
33
To introduce the framework for the economic analysis of the closed
system, the patent and the licensing practices, this discussion will
30. Atari Corp. v. Nintendo Co. Ltd., (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 30, 1989) (No. C-89-0824-
FMS), cited in Abramson, supra note 1, at 29 n.1.
31. Interview with Dan Siegel, Attorney, Irell & Manella, in Menlo Park (Dec. 14, 1989).
32. Labyrinth, supra note 6, at D23, col. 2 (quoting Howard Lincoln, Nintendo senior
vice-president).
33. Courts and commentators have at times suggested various other justifications for
the antitrust laws, including the distribution of wealth, a distrust of concentrations of
private power, and a commitment to entrepreneurial opportunities. See, e.g., United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962); Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust: A New Equilibrium, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1140,
1152-54 (1981). In general, to the extent that these goals favor small businessmen over
large businesses, they do not provide much guidance in a suit between Atari Games and
Nintendo.
VoL 5:1
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compare two basic markets: a competitive market and a monopoly.
34
This comparison will reveal several ways in which a monopoly can
reduce societal wealth.
A competitive market is generally characterized by a large number
of sellers of similar size, marketing a homogeneous product. 5 Each of
the sellers in such a market will try to expand her sales at the expense of
her competitors by reducing her price or by adding things to her product
that consumers value. 36 She will continue striving for additional sales
until the cost of making a sale (including a reasonable rate of return)
exactly equals the revenues she receives for the sale.
Put in economic terms, she will not make any additional sales if the
marginal cost3 7 of making that sale exceeds the price that she would
receive from such sale. For example, if the marginal cost of making a
sale38 is $10, she will not sell to a consumer that is willing to pay only $9.
After all, such a sale would generate a $1 loss for the seller, something she
would rather avoid.
Each seller in the market will strive for additional sales so long as
the proceeds from such sales exceed their cost. This continual
competition for additional profitable sales yields the general rule that in a
competitive market, price will roughly equal marginal cost.
39
Some consumers may value the product at more than its price.
40
(Presumably, no one who values it at less than its price would buy it).
But if any given seller tries to raise her price or adds features that
consumers do not want (at least not at the price she is charging),
consumers will turn to other sellers to supply their needs. Thus,
competition yields a second general rule that in a competitive market, no
single seller can profitably raise prices above the market price.
41
34. See generally R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 92-101 (1978); W. BOWMAN, JR.,
PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL 1-8 (1973); R. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-11 (1976).
35. A market may be competitive even in the absence of one of these characteristics. See
P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 42-45 (1988).
36. She might advertise more heavily, offer a superior warranty, produce the product in
new colors or sizes, or otherwise improve or differentiate her product.
37. Marginal cost is the economic term for the cost of making one more sale. See P.
AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 35, at 14-16.
38. This includes the cost of manufacturing and distributing the product and a
reasonable rate of return.
39. See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 35, at 16-18.
40. We refer to a consumer's subjective valuation above the price as consumer surplus.
Thus, if our consumer would be willing to pay $10 for a widget, but only has to pay $7
because of competition in the market, we say that the consumer has $3 in consumer
surplus.
41. See R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 8-9.
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In a monopoly, the monopolist (by definition) has no effective
competitors. Therefore, the monopolist can raise the price of his good
without losing his sales to a (non-existent) competitor. Of course, he will
sell fewer goods at higher prices because some consumers will not want
the product at the higher price. The monopolist will balance these two
factors, higher price with lower sales volume or lower price with higher
sales volume, to determine the price that maximizes his profit.
Of course, the monopolist would prefer to sell at a high price to
those consumers willing to pay it, and at a low price to those who are
willing to pay only the low price. 42 But, generally, we assume that'a
monopolist will have to charge everyone the same price, that a drop in
price to one more purchaser will apply to all sales and not just the
additional sale.43 Thus, each reduction in price results in revenue from
additional sales generated by such price reduction, but decreases the
revenue the monopolist receives from those sales he could have made at a
higher price.
For example, assume that four consumers would be willing to pay
$5 for the monopolist's product, a fifth would pay $4.50, a sixth would
pay $4, and a seventh would pay $3. If the monopolist can sell his
product at only one of these prices, his options are to sell four products for
total revenue of $20 (4 x $5), five products for $22.50 (5 x $4.50), six
products for $24 (6 x $4), or seven products for $21 (7x $3). The marginal
revenue attributable to the sale of the fifth product is $2.5044, the sixth
product is $1.50, and the seventh product is a loss of $3.
42. Price discrimination refers to selling a product to two consumers with a different
price/marginal cost ratio for each sale. See, e.g., Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of
the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 281 (1966). When the marginal
costs of the two sales are the same, then a difference in price alone would change the
price/marginal cost ratio. For that reason, courts sometimes refer to the practice of
charging different consumers different prices as price discrimination. See, e.g., 0. Hommel
Co. v. Ferro, 659 F.2d 340, 346-47 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
43. The seller may try to develop schemes to enable him to price discriminate. What the
seller wants is some method to meter a consumer's subjective valuation of the product.
The maximum price that a consumer would be willing to pay for a product is known as
the consumer's reservation price. For example, the quantity of punch cards used on a
computer demonstrates how much use a consumer is making of the computer and may be
an effective measure of the consumer's subjective valuation of the right to use the
computer. So instead of charging each consumer a monopolistic price for the computer, a
seller might market the computer at or near marginal cost and then require the consumer
to purchase all of his punch cards from the seller at a monopolistic price. Cf. International
Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
44. The marginal revenue for each sale can be defined as:




Q1 =quantity of sales at P1
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If we assume that a monopolist will not make a sale that reduces his
profit, then he will not make a sale unless his marginal revenue from such
sale exceeds the marginal cost of making it.
45
Therefore, if our monopolist has a marginal cost for the fifth, sixth
and seventh products equal to $2, the monopolist will not make the sixth
sale. The sixth sale would be unprofitable to him because it would cost $2
to make while he would receive only $1.50 in marginal revenue. In
contrast, if the market for these products were competitive, then the price
would fall to marginal cost ($2), and all seven consumers would purchase
the product.
From this analysis emerges a general rule concerning monopolies: a
monopolist will reduce output until his marginal revenue and his
marginal cost are equal.46 A more general case is set out in Figure 1 (see
Appendix for figures).
As shown in the graph, under competitive conditions, price will
equal marginal cost, with the resulting output, Qc. Under uniform
pricing monopoly conditions, output will be set at the point at which
marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal. This output, Qm, will be
less than Qc with a resulting price, Pm, higher than the competitive price,
Pc.
The reduction in output and the resulting higher price has two
effects that the consumer should consider. First, at the higher price, those
consumers who purchase the product will pay more for the product than
they would have paid in a competitive market, transferring wealth from
consumer to monopolist. If the antitrust laws are designed to protect
consumers, 47 then the antitrust laws might be enforced to prevent such
transfers.48 In addition, this transfer can generate real economic loss,





Note that marginal revenue can also be calculated by subtracting the total revenue from
the sale of four products from the total revenue for the sale of five:
MR=$22.50-$20=$2.50.
45. See R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 10.
46. See P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 35, at 14-16.
47. See supra note 33.
48. Some economists do not consider the transfer itself a cognizable economic loss
because the wealth still exists, it has merely been transferred. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note
34, at 106; W. BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 10. Their argument necessarily entails the
premise that a dollar received from the government in the form of a welfare payment is
the same as a dollar received from a customer for work well done. That premise is very
controversial. However, even accepting the argument that transfers are not in and of
themselves objectionable, enforcement of the antitrust laws to preclude such transfers
would still promote economic efficiency when the cost of preventing such transfers
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either through the expenditure of resources by the government to reverse
the transfer49 or through the expenditure by a would-be monopolist to
position himself so as to recover monopoly profits.5 0 Both of these
expenditures would be real economic losses because a party would
expend scarce resources in dividing existing wealth, rather than using the
resources to generate additional wealth. Alternatively, if the possibility
of monopoly profits is tied to something socially valuable, such as new
invention, the lure of monopoly profits might attract the capital necessary
to fund the research leading to new invention.
Second, some consumers who would have paid the competitive
price will not pay the monopoly price, and will turn to substitutes or do
without the product. The unmet demand of these consumers is marked
DWc in Figure 1 and is referred to as a deadweight loss. It represents
consumer surplus not transferred to the monopolist.51 Instead, the
consumer surplus is dissipated in two ways. First, because the output is
lower, some resources that would have been used in a competitive
market to produce the product will become idle or will be put to use in
ways less valuable to society.5 2 Second, consumer substitution generates
real economic loss because consumers will turn to more expensive goods
to satisfy their desires.53 For example, assume that widgets cost $5 to
make, but are priced at $7 because of a widget monopoly. Some
consumers may switch to gidgets that cost $6 to make, but are priced at
$6 because of competition. Because the marginal cost represents the
value of the resources that go into a product, a consumer switching to
gidgets uses $6 in resources when, in the absence of the monopoly, $5 in
resources would have sufficed.
Thus, monopoly can impose significant costs on society in three
ways: (1) the costs of taxing and redistributing unwanted transfers; (2) the
through the antitrust laws is lower than the cost of taxing and redistributing the transfer
on an ongoing basis after the fact, assuming such a tax and redistribution scheme were to
be used.
49. The windfall profits tax can be seen as a device to recapture monopoly profits. The
corporate income tax might also be justified as a second best solution to imperfect
antitrust enforcement, but the costs of the corporate income tax that can be attributed to
any one monopoly, such as Nintendo's, is likely to be very small.
50. In Figure 1, the monopolist receives monopoly profits of MP-LP. LP represents the
profits that would have been made at a competitive output. A monopolist would be
willing to expend up to MP-LP to recover the monopoly profits. See R. POSNER, supra note
34, at 11-14; Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 811-12
(1975); Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 WESTERN EcON. J. 224
(1967). If the amount of the transfer is greater than the transaction costs of organizing to
oppose the transfer and a forum is available that can prevent the transfer, presumably
consumers will expend up to the amount of the transfer to organize and oppose it.
51. See R. BORK, supra note 34, at 101; R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 10-11.
52. See R. BoK, supra note 34, at 101.
53. See R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 11.
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expenditure of resources on capturing a bigger share of the current
societal wealth; and (3) the misallocation of resources because of the
difference between the price and the cost of a monopolized product. The
next two sections will examine the closed system, the licensing practices
and the patent involved in the Atari Games v. Nintendo suit to see which of
these three societal costs are imposed.
B. The Economics of a Closed System
From a consumer's perspective, a closed system means that if a
consumer buys hardware (the base unit in this case) from a manufacturer,
then he must buy all his software from that same manufacturer (or from a
source approved by the manufacturer) as well. Economically, the base
unit and the cartridges, along with the necessary peripherals, are
complements-each is required to create the final product, an interactive
videogame. 54 Thus, if a consumer wants the end product, he will have to
buy at least one of each: a base unit and a cartridge.
55
1. THE ECONOMICS OF COMPLEMENTS.
The economic analysis of complements suggests that for fixed ratio
inputs,56 a closed system presents no greater antitrust concerns than an
open system. With fixed ratio inputs, market power57 with respect to one
of the inputs enables the monopolist to recover a full monopoly profit on
the end product.
To illustrate this concept, consider a market where left and right
shoe are produced and sold independently.58 To produce a pair of shoes
(the end product) requires, generally, one left shoe and one right shoe
(the inputs). The inputs have a fixed ratio of one to one. In this
imaginary world, producing and selling either a left or right shoe costs $5.
Assume further that there are 1000 consumers who uniformly value a
54. Note that some substitution between cartridges and base units is possible. A group
of families might get together and buy one base unit for all of their kids. Of course,
because only one or two people can play at a time (and because it is a lot more fun to play
than to watch), such substitution has limits.
55. The base unit generally comes with one game cartridge and a set of joysticks. A
consumer buys additional cartridges and "controllers" sold independently. See, e.g., The
Kid, supra note 6, at 67.
56. Fixed ratio inputs means that the end product requires a certain fixed proportion of
each input. See, e.g., W. BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 70.
57. Nintendo has market power if it can earn higher profits by charging more than the
competitive price. See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enter., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620
(1977).
58. I am indebted to Professor William Baxter for this example.
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pair of shoes at $15 for the first pair and at $0 for all subsequent pairs.
59 If
the market is competitive, price will equal marginal cost, and each shoe
will sell for $5. Consumers will pay a total of $10 for each pair of shoes.
The $5 difference between price ($10) and value ($15) of a pair of shoes is
consumer surplus.
On the other hand, assume a shoe company, United Shoe, has a
monopoly (perhaps due to a series of patents) on the production of both
left and right shoes. To maximize its short-run profits, United Shoe will
price each pair of shoes at $15. Pricing below $15 reduces income without
increasing sales, and at a price above $15, consumers will switch to the
next best substitute. Thus, with a monopoly on the production and sale
of both shoes, United Shoe, by pricing each pair at $15, will recover $15
per pair instead of $10. United Shoe is converting the $5 in consumer
surplus into monopoly profits.
Even assuming that the monopoly only reaches right shoes, and left
shoes are produced and sold competitively (at $5 each), United Shoe can
price the right shoe at $10, yielding a total price per pair to consumers of
$15.60 Thus, United Shoe can, by monopolistically pricing the right shoe
alone, recover the same monopoly profit available to it as monopolist of
the production of both shoes.
Even relaxing the unrealistic assumption of a step function demand
curve, a monopolist of one input can achieve as much monopoly profit as
can a monopolist of the end product so long as the ratio of inputs in the
final product remains constant and the other inputs are sold at a
competitive price. With fixed ratio inputs, if one seller monopolizes two
of the inputs, the harm to society is no greater than it was when the seller
had a monopoly in only one of the inputs.
61
Thus, given that Nintendo has a monopoly in the sale of the base
units,62 if the base unit and the cartridges are fixed ratio inputs, a second
monopoly in cartridges (controlled by Nintendo) imposes no greater
59. Such a demand curve is known as a step function demand curve because after the
first 1000 pairs of shoes, the demand for a shoe "steps" down from $15 to $0.
60. The left shoes, priced competitively, will each sell for $5. To maximize its profits,
United Shoe will price each right shoe at $10 ($15-$5). Again, pricing below $10 will
reduce income without increasing sales, and pricing above $10 will drive consumers to
substitution.
61. See, e.g., W. BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 70-76; R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 173. Note
that the situation changes if two different sellers each have a monopoly on one of the
inputs. If the two monopolists cannot come to some agreement distributing monopoly
profits, each may price his input to recover the full monopoly profit on the end product.
This double monopoly mark-up will increase the price of the final end product over the
single monopoly mark-up price, and significantly increase the resulting societal loss. See,
e.g., W. BOWMAN, supra, at 72.
62. Nintendo has a 75-80% share of the base unit market. See, e.g., The Kid, supra note 6,
at 67. Nintendo also has the largest library of software for home videogames. Id. at 67.
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societal costs. However, the analysis of monopolies in fixed ratio inputs
cannot be applied directly to the Nintendo case because the input ratios
are not fixed. With one base unit, any number of game cartridges may be
used to produce any number of interactive videogames-the game
cartridges and the base unit are non-fixed ratio units.
2. PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND NON-FIXED RATIO INPUTS.
Given its monopoly in one input, the base unit, the question for
Nintendo is how best to capture the area under the demand curve.
Figure 2a illustrates a hypothetical demand curve for the NES, and the
output and price under competitive conditions (see Appendix for
figures).
Under the assumed cost and demand curves and under competitive
conditions, 8 million base units would be sold at a price of $100. Nintendo
would receive no monopoly profits, only a reasonable rate of return
included in the $100 price. If the assumed curves were correct, consumer
surplus would total $1.6 billion.
The first option for Nintendo to capture some part of this consumer
surplus would be to exploit its monopoly in the base unit by reducing the
supply of base units and raising their price. Nintendo would let anyone
produce game cartridges for its system (an open system). Competition in
the cartridge market would drive the price of cartridges down to near
marginal cost, somewhere around $10.63 Figure 2b depicts the economic
effects of monopolistic pricing of the base unit.
To maximize its profits, Nintendo could have reduced production to
4 million units and raised the price of the base unit to $300. If the
assumed demand curve is correct, consumer surplus would be reduced to
$400 million, Nintendo would have converted $800 million of the
consumer surplus under competitive conditions into monopoly profits,
and the remaining $400 million of the consumer surplus under
competitive conditions would become deadweight loss.
A second option, the one actually taken, would be to use its market
power in the NES to control the production and sale of the cartridges.
The lock-out system perfectly implements such an extension. With a
patent on the lock-out system, Nintendo can limit the production of
cartridges and maintain their price significantly above a competitive
level. Nintendo can do this unilaterally by setting the price of the blank
cartridge 64 equal to the profit maximizing (monopolistic) price of the
63. The $10 figure is the current price for cartridges on an open system such as the old
Atari. See Zapped, supra note 7, at 67.
64. Nintendo unilaterally sets blank cartridge prices under the license terms. See Atari's
Complaint, supra note 3, at 7; see also Abramson, supra note 1, at 24 & n.9.
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programmed cartridge less the marginal cost of programming the
cartridge. The base unit can then be priced competitively and the
monopoly profits recovered through sale of the blank cartridges.
65
Nintendo may have had any number of reasons to prefer
monopolistic pricing of the cartridges rather than of the base units. Some
of these reasons are consistent with a consumer's interest; some of them
are not. What Nintendo might hope to achieve by monopolistic pricing of
the cartridges is illustrated in Figure 2c.
Nintendo no longer takes one shot at recovering its monopoly
profits, as in Figure 2b. Instead, it charges a monopoly price for each
cartridge it sells. Assuming that the number of cartridges that a
consumer purchases exactly correlates with the consumer's reservation
price, monopolistic pricing of the cartridges generates the stair-step
pricing curve shown in Figure 2c, in which the price over marginal cost a
consumer pays depends on the number of cartridges that the consumer
buys. Thus, if a consumer purchases the NES and 5 cartridges, she will
pay $100 (5 x $20) over marginal cost. If a consumer purchases the NES
and 20 cartridges, she will pay $400 over marginal cost. In comparison,
with monopoly pricing on the base unit, a consumer pays the
monopolistic mark-up ($200 under the assumptions of Figure 2b) only
once regardless of how many cartridges that consumer buys.
Figure 2c was constructed assuming that the number of cartridges a
consumer purchases perfectly coincides with the value of the system to
that consumer.66 This assumption is unlikely to be true because some
consumers may enjoy just a few games, but value those at well over
marginal cost, while others may enjoy many, but value each additional
game at only slightly over marginal cost. The number of cartridges that
the average consumer purchases is likely to have some relation to her
reservation price, but is probably not an exact predictor.
In determining the effects of monopolistic pricing of the cartridges
as the extent to which the number of cartridges purchased predicts a
consumer's reservation price, Figures 2b and 2c represent the two
paradigm cases: if the number of cartridges purchased has no relation to
the consumer's reservation price, then monopolistic pricing of the
cartridges will result in the deadweight loss, consumer surplus and
65. Note that if the result in the case requires Nintendo to remove the chips or to grant
royalty-free licenses, then Nintendo will lose some portion of the monopoly profits they
were planning to recover, transferring the wealth from Nintendo to those consumers that
have already bought the base unit.
66. Thus, if a consumer values the end product (the home videogames) at $20 more
than marginal cost, he will purchase one additional cartridge. If he values the end
product at $40 over marginal cost, he will purchase two additional cartridges. A
consumer who values home videogames at $400 over marginal cost would buy 20
cartridges.
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monopoly profit shown in Figure 2b, and be no different than
monopolistic pricing of the base unit. If the number of cartridges
purchased were an exact indicator, then Figure 2c would be accurate.
Despite the fact that the assumption of perfect prediction
underlying Figure 2c is almost certainly incorrect, Figure 2c remains
valuable because it identifies the direction of the shift that will occur in
deadweight loss, consumer surplus and monopoly profits as the number
of cartridges purchased becomes a better and better indicator of the
consumer's reservation price. As the number of cartridges purchased
becomes a better indicator of reservation price, both consumer surplus
and deadweight loss are reduced, while monopoly profits grow.
Thus, Nintendo (to some extent) can use the cartridges as a device
to price discriminate-to measure the value of the end product to the
consumer and to charge the consumer a total price close to that value. If
the purchase of game cartridges perfectly coincides with a consumer's
subjective valuation, as in Figure 2c, then consumer surplus would be
only $76 million (down from $1.6 billion under competition and $400
million with monopoly pricing of the base unit); deadweight loss would
be $4 million (down from $400 million with monopoly pricing of the base
unit);67 and monopoly profits would be up to $1.52 billion (up from $800
million with monopoly pricing of the base unit).
By comparing the two paradigm cases, one can identify the proper
lines of inquiry within the economic framework identified in section A.
68
This monopoly generates costs for society by (1) necessitating
government expenditures to tax and redistribute disfavored transfers of
consumer surplus (likely to be small since a special Nintendo tax seems
unlikely); (2) enticing expenditures by Nintendo to increase its monopoly
profits and to better recover the consumer surplus; and (3) misallocation
of resources due to differences between price and cost (represented by the
deadweight area).69 In looking at the societal costs of monopoly in this
case, the relevant comparison is between monopoly pricing of the base
unit and monopoly pricing of the cartridges, with the other input priced
at marginal cost.70 As compared to the monopolistic pricing of the base
67. Note that Nintendo could sell the first cartridge at marginal cost, perhaps including
it in a package with the base unit. If it did so, then deadweight loss would be converted to
consumer surplus, eliminating any deadweight loss and increasing consumer surplus to
$80 million under the assumptions in Figure 2c.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
69. See supra text following note 53.
70. It is the use of monopoly power to restrain competition that antitrust laws are
designed to prevent. See, e.g., Christofferson Dairy, Inc. v. MMM Sales, Inc., 849 F.2d 1168,
1174 (9th Cir. 1988). Determining whether Nintendo has done anything that restrains
competition requires a comparison of the economic effects of what it could legally do
(unilaterally set the output and price of the base unit) and what it has done (used its
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unit, monopolistic pricing of the cartridges generates both economic
losses and economic gains.
Monopoly pricing of the cartridges generates real economic losses in
the form of resources that are expended to tax and redistribute the
transfer in consumer surplus and in resources expended by Nintendo to
enable it to control the sale of the cartridges (basically the costs of
obtaining and enforcing its patent). At the same time, monopoly pricing
of the cartridges produces an economic gain by reducing deadweight
loss, permitting resources to be allocated to their most valued use.
One additional factor affecting societal wealth, not considered
under the static demand curves presented in the figures above, is that the
demand curves for the product may be different initially or may develop
differently under the two pricing schemes. If consumers are uncertain or
unaware of the true value of the NES to them, they might prefer to pay a
small up-front cost until they can find out if and how much they like
playing the NES, rather than have to pay the entire monopolistic mark-up
at the outset. Once they know they like it, they might be willing to buy
more game cartridges, even though each game cartridge carries a
monopolistic mark-up. Thus, by pricing the NES at marginal cost and
monopolistically pricing the cartridges, Nintendo may also be increasing
the demand for the final product (NES entertainment) by permitting
people to try it before having to pay a monopolistic mark-up. 71
While this increase in demand would likely have developed
eventually through consumer exposure to the NES either from
advertising by Nintendo or from playing on a friend's machine, the
trying-it-first alternative is likely to get more people interested in the
game sooner than would word of mouth or advertising. It might also
provide considerable advertising savings because people would
presumably need less media encouragement.
On the other hand, under the closed system, Nintendo decides
which games will and which games will not be available for play on the
NES. If Nintendo guesses wrong as to which games are more valuable to
society, then the demand for the product under a closed system may be
less than it would be under an open system.72 Because Nintendo's
market power in the base unit to control the sale of cartridges). Of course, if Nintendo has
used its market power in the base unit to restrain competition, then the court can take
steps to reduce or eliminate Nintendo's market power in the base unit. See, e.g., Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 77-78 (1911).
71. Cf. International Business Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936)
(requirement that lessee operate leased machines only with cards supplied by lessor was
unlawful tie even where purpose and effect of tie was to protect goodwill of the lessor
since less restrictive alternatives were available).
72. Cf. Labyrinth, supra note 6, at D23, col. 6. Evidence in the market for personal
computers suggests that consumers prefer open systems. See, e.g., Gelfond, IBM's Micro
VoL 5:1
ATARI GAMES V. NINTENDO 45
returns are determined by the demand, Nintendo has every incentive to
pick those games providing the greatest demand. However, Nintendo's
decision to go with a closed system does not necessarily indicate a higher
societal value with a closed system as compared to an open system. After
all, Nintendo would be willing to trade off the higher demand of an open
system against lower demand for a closed system because it can recover
more of the closed system demand.
Thus, the closed system may shift demand (as compared to the
demand under monopoly pricing of the base unit) either up or down,
depending on the relative magnitudes of the increase due to the lower
up-front costs and the decrease due to Nintendo's inability to correctly
predict consumers' desires. Because the area under the demand curve for
a product provides a rough estimate of its societal value, this shift in
demand changes the value of the NES to society and societal wealth.
Thus, the closed system may generate economic gains by reducing
deadweight loss and by increasing the demand for the NES today. It may
generate economic losses by (possibly) requiring government
expenditures to tax and redistribute the consumer surplus transferred to
Nintendo, by requiring expenditures by Nintendo to create and defend its
closed system, and by decreasing demand for the NES.
If the antitrust laws should be used solely to promote wealth
creation,73 the court should weigh the gains and the losses. Only if the
losses outweigh the gains should the closed system be illegal. If the
antitrust laws should be used to prevent transfers of wealth from
consumer to monopolist, 74 then the amount of consumer surplus
transferred would be an additional loss to weigh into the balance.
At this level, economic analysis can provide no certain answer. We
cannot tell without a detailed analysis of the demand and cost curves the
respective amounts of the demand shift, the deadweight loss saved, and
the consumer surplus transferred, nor do we know the amount that
Nintendo has spent (and is spending) to obtain and enforce its patent and
licensing practices.
This analysis suggests that, at the very least, closed systems, even
where the manufacturer has market power, should not be per se illegal.
Rather, the necessity of a detailed factual inquiry points to consideration
Channel Gets a Little Respect, Bus. WK., Mar. 20, 1989, at 156, 156-58; Helm, Can Apollo Stop
Hurtling Toward Earth?, Bus. WK., Feb. 27, 1989, at 108; Microsoft Hedges Its Bets, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 27, 1989, at 46.
73. See supra note 33.
74. Since all monopolies transfer some wealth, such a position entails a partial return to
the notion of no-fault monopoly of cases such as United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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under the rule of reason.75 However, this analysis has assumed that
Nintendo is using a closed system solely to price discriminate. 76 Both
sides have expressed other reasons to justify or condemn this particular
method of creating a closed system.
3. NINTENDO'S JUSTIFICATIONS OF ITS PRACTICES.
Nintendo has suggested that the lock-out system and the licensing
restrictions are designed to protect "(i) the intellectual property and trade
secrets of Nintendo Co. Ltd. ("NCL") and Nintendo of America ("NOA"),
(ii) all the rights and benefits enjoyed by each licensee of NOA, (iii) the
goodwill and favorable reputation enjoyed by NOA, and (iv) the
goodwill and favorable reputation enjoyed by each licensee of NOA." 77
Nintendo also asserts that the lock-out system and the licensing practices
ensure the quality of cartridges playable on the NES. 78
Two justifications can be drawn from these somewhat vague
statements. Both relate back to lessons learned from the collapse of the
first home videogame market. Nintendo and others believed that the first
market became "flooded with low quality, poorly performing video game.
cartridges" which eventually destroyed it. 7 9 Looking at the various
justifications offered in light of this sentiment, the lock-out system
appears to be intended to avoid two things: cheap cartridges and poor
quality cartridges.
As for cheap cartridges, Nintendo might argue that when the price
of a cartridge drops to near marginal cost, a producer of good quality
software cannot earn sufficient return to cover the producer's investment
in creating the software. Perhaps imitations are made that replicate the
look and feel of the game, yet do not violate the producer's copyright in
the game. These close imitations drive the price the creative software
producer can charge down to marginal cost before he can recover his
initial investment in creating the product. Because the creative publisher
does not recover his investment, he will eventually be driven out of
business, leaving the imitators with no one to imitate and society with
poor quality games.
75. For the differences between per se rules and a rule of reason inquiry, see generally
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
76. If the marginal cost of each sale is the same, such metering is a type of price
discrimination. See supra note 42.
77. Nintendo Claims 'Lock Out' Device Has Bona Fide Uses, 1989 COMPUTER INDUS.
LMGATION REP. 8894, 8895.
78. Id.
79. Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 5-6; see also Rumble in the Arcade, supra note 2,
at 37.
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This justification raises two questions: one concerning economic
results, the other concerning whether the courts or the legislature should
properly decide the issue. Economically, this justification raises the
factual question of whether Nintendo's maintenance of monopolistic
returns to producers actually increases the quality and the quantity of
videogames. While the question is easily stated, it may prove nearly
impossible to answer.
80
If Nintendo did not have market power, then the court could accept
Nintendo's decision concerning the proper incentive to its licensees as an
accurate proxy for the level of incentive that would create the greatest
societal benefit.81 After all, Nintendo would not give the software
producers any more than what Nintendo felt was necessary to obtain
high quality software. 82 As a general rule, Nintendo is likely to be a
much better judge than Congress of how much incentive is required.
The only trouble is that Nintendo is a monopolist. As a monopolist,
Nintendo may decide to share some of its monopoly profits for a second
reason: to discourage its licensees from doing anything that might disturb
the monopoly. 83 Because the licensees are sharing a part of the monopoly
profits, they may refrain from taking steps that increase competition for
Nintendo. For example, they might refuse to create versions of their
programs for use with Sega or Atari Corporation's base unit (even in the
absence of the two year exclusive outlet term in the license). 84 Giving
these potential competitors an incentive not to compete may increase
Nintendo's market power, its ability to charge a higher price, and thereby
increase the societal costs (or benefits) 85 of Nintendo's monopoly.
Because the court cannot rely on Nintendo to act in a manner
consistent with the interests of consumers, the court would have to decide
if these increased costs are justified by the increase in consumer welfare
80. Economists have been arguing for years about whether the monopolistic returns of
the patent system increase societal wealth. See, e.g., W. BOWMAN, supra note 34, at 15-16;
Baxter, supra note 42, at 267-75.
81. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 & n.24 (1977);
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725-28 (1988); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring); R. BORK,
supra note 34, at 290.
82. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 34, at 290.
83. Cf. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 281 (1942) (fixing prices and
abandoning competition may provide more profit than maintaining competition).
84. Note that all the licensees, except Atari Games and Tengen who are trying to
capitalize on their reverse engineering of the lock-out system, like the licensing
restrictions. See Labyrinth, supra note 6, at D23, col. 4 (quoting Robert Holmes, chief
operating officer, Acclaim).
85. Recall that the cost-benefit question was an empirical question left undecided. See
supra text accompanying notes 74-75. In addition, the closed system might be desirable to
enable Nintendo to subsidize software production if the copyright system provides an
inadequate incentive to invest in software production.
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from higher quality videogames. Given the difficulty of answering that
question, 86 the court may simply find against the party who bears the
burden of proof8 7 or may refuse to consider it by finding that Congress,
and not Nintendo (or the courts), should determine if additional returns
to videogame publishers are warranted.88
As for the second justification, that of preventing poor quality
cartridges, Nintendo is arguing, in a sense, that Nintendo knows best. If
it can control the videogames available for play on the NES, consumers
will value the NES more highly. Nintendo will arrange the playing cycle
for consumers, letting them learn the tricks of each game before leading
them to the next game.89 Furthermore, Nintendo will eliminate poor
quality games altogether, leaving a consumer free to pick up any NES
cartridge with a reasonable expectation that the game will be fun.
Nintendo is arguing, essentially, that it is performing a certification
function for consumers. 90 Nintendo is saying that consumers will value
the system more highly if consumers only play games that Nintendo has
approved. Requiring all NES-compatible cartridges to bear the Nintendo
trademark enables Nintendo to communicate this approval to the
consumer. This certification process, therefore, is critical to Nintendo's
marketing scheme, or so Nintendo would contend.
Certainly, Nintendo's trademark, as is true of every trademark, is
intended to identify the source of the goods and to assure consumers of a
consistent level of quality.91 ' If the only effect of the trademark
requirement were to increase the value of the game to the consumer by
providing information not otherwise available, then the trademark
requirement would increase societal wealth and should be permitted.
92
86. See supra note 81.
87. The burden of proof may be crucial in a number of these areas. For that reason,
establishing a per se illegal tie that places the burden on Nintendo may prove critical for
Atari. See infra notes 137-55 & 161-75 and accompanying text.
88. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 441 U.S. 1, 15-16, 19
(1979) (in upholding BMI's blanket licensing scheme, the Court noted that Congress, in the
1976 amendments to the Copyright Act, had approved of blanket licenses for other,
similar situations, and had generally strengthened the rights of copyright owners to
control public performances of their copyrighted works); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., __ U.S. __ ; 109 S. Ct. 971, 975 (1989) (in striking down a
Florida statute protecting boat hulls, the Court noted the careful balancing embodied in
the patent laws between promoting invention and ensuring competition).
89. See, e.g., Lazzareschi, Lawsuits Against Nintendo Go to Heart of the Way Japan Competes,
L.A. Times, Mar. 19, 1989, § IV (Business), at 6, col. 6.
90. Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 6.
91. 3 L. ALTMAN, CALLMAN UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MONOPOLIES, § 17.01,
at 2 (4th ed. 1983).
92. See 1A L. ALTMAN, supra note 91, § 4.53, at 2.
ATARI GAMES V. NINTENDO 49
However, the certification is mandatory. 93 Either the game satisfies
Nintendo and is marketed under their trademark, or it does not, in which
case it is not marketed for use on the NES. If consumers really do value
games approved by Nintendo more highly, then consumers should be
willing to pay more for a cartridge with the Nintendo certification than
they would for a cartridge without it, although not necessarily an amount
comparable to the monopoly mark-up the game cartridges currently
carry. And if consumers were willing to pay more, then videogame
producers should seek the mark from Nintendo. Nintendo should not
have to force videogame producers to take the trademark unless it is
trying to extract the full monopoly mark-up, rather than simply the value
of its certification.
Nintendo might respond by saying that consumers do not realize
how much more they prefer games approved by Nintendo. Furthermore,
Nintendo might say that to find out, consumers might have to buy a
number of poor quality non-approved cartridges before making the
connection. Some of these disgruntled purchasers might associate their
dissatisfaction with the NES itself and quit buying cartridges altogether,
rather than learning to buy only approved games.
But if consumers are unaware that some games play on the NES, yet
are not made or approved by Nintendo, the proper course would seem to
be to inform the public. To permit Nintendo to control the supply of
game cartridges simply because consumers might not, in the end, know
what is good for them runs directly counter to the scheme established by
the antitrust laws. 94
Basically, if Nintendo wants to share some of its market power with
the producers of the software or to identify good quality games to
consumers, Nintendo can license the use of its trademark separately from
the right to sell NES-compatible games. But the mandatory nature of the
license suggests that Nintendo's motives, and the likely effects, are not so
salutary.
93. See Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 6. The packaging requirements are
spelled out in Appendix B of the licensing agreement. See Answer of Atari Games to First
Amended Complaint, at Exhibit A, Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Atari Games Corp. (N.D. Cal.
filed July 20, 1989) (No. C-89-0027-FMS). The package will bear the name of the game, the
software producer, and a notation that it is produced under license by Nintendo. In
addition, the packaging will indicate that the game is for play on the Nintendo
Entertainment System, and the licensee will affix the Nintendo Quality Assurance Seal to
the package. Id. at 2.
94. Cf. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-95 (1978)
(argument that competitive bidding will result in unsafe engineering works cannot be
considered under a rule of reason inquiry since antitrust laws were established on the
assumption that competition is best).
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4. ATARI'S COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE LICENSE.
Atari has asserted that the mandatory nature of the trademark
license, along with the output restrictions on both the quantity and the
number of titles, and the exclusive outlet restrictions, 95 are all part of a
plan by Nintendo to monopolize the home videogame industry.96 Atari
argues that the closed system and the licensing restrictions enable
Nintendo to maintain or increase its market power by creating entry
barriers that increase the costs for potential competitors seeking to enter
the home videogame market.
Note that each restriction is formally structured as a vertical
arrangement, that is the agreements are between manufacturers of
complements. To the extent that these restraints are truly vertical, they
pose little in the way of antitrust concerns.9 7 In each case, the question
we must ask is whether, despite their vertical appearance, they create
horizontal effects.
For example, the trademark license restriction, given its mandatory
nature, may limit consumer recognition of the actual source of the games
that a consumer likes. For example, a consumer's favorite game for the
NES may be RBI Baseball, a game written by Atari Games. But when the
95. Exclusive dealing and exclusive outlet arrangements differ based on who, in the
distribution chain, agrees to the exclusive restriction. For example, if a wholesaler agrees
to sell only one manufacturer's products, the wholesaler is an exclusive dealer of the
manufacturer; he has agreed to deal exclusively in the goods of that one manufacturer.
Here, we have an exclusive outlet arrangement: the software publishers (the
manufacturers) agree to sell their goods solely through Nintendo (the wholesaler). If
Nintendo agreed to sell only software published by Tengen, then Nintendo would be an
exclusive dealer for Tengen's products.
96. Atari's Complaint, supra note 3, at 7-8. Another restriction prohibits the licensees
from selling the cartridges outside the United States. Id. at 8. This geographical restriction
operates to eliminate potential competition between cartridge sellers in Japan and the
United States. Equivalent restrictions in Japan limit the supply to consumers in the United
States. This article will not address the antitrust implications of these restrictions to avoid
getting into an extended discussion of the extraterritorial applications of the Sherman Act.
Note that courts have reached differing conclusions on whether export prohibitions on
patent licensees are a violation of the antitrust laws. Compare Brownell v. Ketcham Wire &
Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 129 (9th Cir. 1954) (export limitation lawful) and American Optical
Co. v. New Jersey Optical Co., 58 F. Supp. 601,606 (D. Mass. 1944) (patent owner has right
to make territorial restrictions including limits on foreign sales) with Extractol Process,
Ltd. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, 153 F.2d 264, 267-68 (7th Cir. 1946) (patent owner whose
licensee sold product to a foreign buyer has no infringement rights against that foreign
buyer's use outside the United States).
97. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 & n.24 (1977);
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-28 (1988); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 44-45 (O'Connor, J., concurring); R. BORK,
supra note 34, at 290.
ATARI GAMES V. NINTENDO 51
consumer looks at the cartridge, he sees Nintendo's name in bold letters
and so associates his excitement with Nintendo, not Atari.
While on an individual level the impact may seem small, Nintendo
markets over a hundred titles produced by some 36 licensees under the
Nintendo trademark.98 Each time someone thinks of the game they like
best, chances are that it is the Nintendo name they remember and not the
actual programmer.
This increases the costs for Nintendo's competitors in two ways.
First, if a Nintendo licensee is also a potential competitor in the system
market, it directly restricts consumer recognition of the licensee, as
opposed to Nintendo, as someone whose products the consumer enjoys.
Second, if a given software publisher produces a game that is compatible
with both Nintendo and other base units, consumers may believe,
erroneously, that the two games are not the same. For example, a
consumer might believe that Nintendo RBI Baseball is not the same as
Atari Games RBI Baseball manufactured for a competing system. These
misled consumers, who are familiar with Nintendo, are more likely to
stick with Nintendo because that is the name they know.
These concerns suggest that a hardware maker with market power
should not be permitted to require software producers to market under
the hardware maker's trademark. A separate and optional trademark
license would not generate these costs for competitors but would
effectively accomplish the legitimate information-providing function of a
trademark.
The second major license restriction forbids licensees from adapting
games approved under the license terms for use on other home
videogame systems for two years.99 Because the availability of high
quality software is key to a competitor challenging Nintendo's market
position, and because only a few really popular games come out each
year, tying up the top games through the exclusive outlet restriction cuts
off the competitor's supply of quality software and strikes to the heart of
his ability to compete. 100
To understand how this works, consider the nature of the market
for software titles. Initially, software publishers create videogames for
arcades. If a game has a successful run in the arcade, the designer will
98. See, e.g., Rumble in the Arcade, supra note 2, at 37; Zapped, supra note 7, at 67.
99. Two years is a long time for the computer market. For example, Super Mario
Brothers was marketed with base units back in 1985 when the game first went on the
market. Super Mario Brothers II went on the market in late 1988 or early 1989, three and a
half to four years later. See, e.g., Lazzareschi, supra note 89, § IV, at 6, col 6. Super Mario
Brothers III went on the market in Japan at about the same time. (The product cycle is one
step ahead in Japan because the system was introduced there three years earlier.) Id.
100. See, e.g., Zapped, supra note 7, at 67.
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create a home version. Given an either-or choice between going with
Nintendo alone (and its 75% market share) or producing for all the rest,
many are going to choose Nintendo, even though Nintendo will use its
monopsony power to extract concessions from the software publisher, in
the form of lower royalties or undesired license restrictions (such as the
exclusive outlet and trademark restrictions). 101 That choice leaves
Nintendo's competitors with some older games, some less successful
games, and some games that are merely approximate copies of the
popular games. 10 2 It reinforces Nintendo's market power in its base unit
and seems designed to limit Nintendo's competition.
10 3
This arrangement closely resembles the network monopoly aspect
of telephone service.104 Network monopoly refers to the fact that the
value of a phone to a user is directly related to how many people she can
call when she picks up the phone, that is how many people are on the
network. If she has a choice between a phone system that reaches 90% of
the population and one that reaches only 10%, and prices are the same on
a per call basis, she will most likely choose the former.105 Other
consumers will do the same. Eventually, the 10% of the population
signed up for the second system will opt for service by the first, driving
the second system out of business.
The situation between Nintendo and software publishers is similar.
Each time a publisher decides to go exclusively with Nintendo, it
becomes that much more likely that the publisher of the next hot game
will too. This network effect means that Atari Corporation and Sega will
find it very difficult to obtain the most popular games for their machines.
While the availability of other software may mean that they are not
driven from the market completely, they will never be able to effectively
compete with Nintendo because Nintendo will always have the best
games.
Therefore, because network monopoly effects are inherent in the
market for home videogame production, Nintendo should be prohibited
101. Id. A buyer with market power is known as a monopsonist. The economic effects
of monopoly and monopsony are the same. R. POSNER, supra note 34, at 209.
102. Cf. Zapped, supra note 7, at 67.
103. See, e.g., Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988); Cass
Student Adv. v. National Educ. Adv. Serv., 537 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1976); L.G. Balfour Co. v.
FTC, 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
104. Whereas the phone company is a monopoly selling services to consumers,
Nintendo has monopsony power as a buyer of home videogame programs from software
publishers.
105. This reflects the general case. Consumers might exist that value contact with the
10% more highly than contact with the other 90% (assuming that the two groups are
mutually exclusive). However, this analysis assumes that the people to whom the
consumer wants to speak are divided proportionally between the two systems.
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from enforcing the exclusive outlet restrictions in the license. This does
not mean that Nintendo has to operate an open system. A closed system,
standing alone, does not create the network monopoly effects to any
significant degree.
10 6
The restrictions on the number of titles and the output of each title
provide a method for Nintendo to prevent a recurrence of the "flood of
cheap, poor quality game cartridges that killed the first video boom... 1
' °7
The restriction on the number of titles seems designed to ensure that only
the best games are approved for production. Such a quality check is
likely to have little anticompetitive effect except when combined with the
exclusive outlet restriction. If the publisher can market only five titles a
year to 75-80% of the market, he will likely select the titles that were most
popular in the arcade. Thus, the title restriction combined with the
exclusive outlet provision ensures that only Nintendo gets the best titles
each game publisher can offer.
The restriction on output prevents the flood and is one way to
maintain the monopolistic pricing of the cartridges. 0 8 It should therefore
be judged by the standards established for the closed system °. 0 9
C. Does the Lock-out Patent Change Anything?
Nintendo has alleged that Atari's manufacture and sale of blank
NES-compatible cartridges infringes Nintendo's patent on the lock-out
system.110 While Nintendo may not generally use its patent to control the
sale of non-patented articles (such as the blank cartridges),111 under
section 271 of the patent statute, Nintendo can control the sale of a non-
staple article without misusing the patent.112 Nintendo argues that a
blank cartridge containing the lock-out chip is a non-staple article.113
Nintendo concludes that, because the cartridge is a non-staple article,
106. If a system is closed, the software publisher need only expend the relatively minor
resources to convert to the format of the other systems. The software publisher will
expend the resources whenever the sales on the new format will pay back the costs of
conversion.
107. Rumble in the Arcade, supra note 2, at 37; see also Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4,
at 5.
108. Nintendo could also maintain the high price by setting the price of blank cartridges
at the desired price less the marginal cost of incorporating the software.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
110. See Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 21.
111. See Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942); Motion Picture
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 517 (1917).
112. 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(b),(c),(d) (West 1984 & Supp. 1989). A non-staple article is an
article that has no commercial use except in connection with a patent. See, e.g., Rohm &
Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 599 F.2d 685, 703-04 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 448 U.S. 176
(1981).
113. Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 21.
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Nintendo should be free to sue to enjoin the manufacture and sale of
blank NES-compatible cartridges without violating the antitrust laws.
1 14
The patent system functions as an incentive to produce
innovations. 115 Without the protection afforded by the patent system,
inventions placed on the market would be rapidly copied. The copies
would force the price that the inventor could charge down to something
approaching marginal cost. At that price, an inventor would never be
able to recover his investment, in time and money, in creating the
invention. Not only would he be unable to recover a significant fraction
of the societal value of his invention, he would likely lose money on the
entire venture.116 To avoid this result, the Constitution provides for,
117
and Congress has adopted, the patent system.118 The patent system
provides certain rights that enable an inventor to recover a significant
fraction of the societal value of his invention, thereby making invention a
paying proposition. 119 The patent system, at the same time, sends the
proper signals to the market so that people will invest in research
according to the societal value of the expected results.
120
In this case, the patent system should provide a return to the
inventors approximating the societal value of their invention-the lock-
out system. Thus, our inquiry begins with determining some measure of
the societal value of the lock-out system.
Assume that a demand curve is created by drawing a line through
the reservation price of each consumer for a certain good. The area under
the demand curve will serve as an adequate definition of societal value.
By comparing societal wealth before the lock-out system was invented
and after the invention, the value of the lock-out system can be
established. Societal wealth, pre-lock-out, is determined by drawing the
demand curve for the NES 1 21 without the lock-out system. Societal
wealth after the invention is determined by drawing the demand curve
for the NES with the lock-out system. The societal value of the invention
is the difference between these two-the difference between the area
114. Id. at 22.
115. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., - U.S. _, _ 109 S. Ct. 971,
975 (1989); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480 (1974).
116. Cf. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 19 n.32 (1979)
(protection of musical compositions under the copyright laws necessary because of public-
good nature of the work).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
118. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-294 (West 1984 & Supp. 1989).
119. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
120. See generally P. AREEDA & L. KAPLOW, supra note 35, at 169-73.
121. Since this paper analyzes only the antitrust implications of the patent as used in
the NES, societal wealth as a whole need not be examined, but we can focus on the wealth
effects of the patent as part of the NES.
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under the with-lock-out demand curve and the area under the without-
lock-out demand curve.
Is there any reason to expect that the societal value of the NES will
be higher with the lock-out system than without it?122 The lock-out
patent enables Nintendo to establish both the closed system and the
licensing restrictions. The societal value created by the patent is therefore
the societal value created by the closed system and the licensing
restrictions. As discussed above, these practices have uncertain effects on
societal wealth.
1 23
What really appears to be going on is that Nintendo is using the
patent to recover not the societal value of the invention (which appears to
be negligible), but the consumer surplus associated with the without-
lock-out NES. 124 The patent allows Nintendo to recover more monopoly
profits; all of the money spent to create the invention, to obtain the patent,
and now to enforce it, is simply one of the costs imposed on society by the
possibility of monopoly profits.125 Instead of expending resources
inventing new ways to create societal wealth, Nintendo has spent its
resources inventing new ways to capture existing wealth.
The sole purpose of the patent is to enable Nintendo to enforce the
licensing agreements. If the licensing agreements create net societal
wealth, then the patent should be enforced. To the extent that the
licensing agreements contain provisions that reduce societal value by
restricting competition, a patent on the enforcement mechanism should
not change the antitrust analysis.
III. WHAT THE COURTS MIGHT SAY
This preliminary economic analysis suggests that the antitrust
analysis should focus on the closed system, the trademark tie-in, and the
122.There might be many situations in which a method of securing information stored
in a computer would have societal value, such as securing secret information of the
government.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
124. Courts and commentators have noted that price discrimination to recover the
societal value of the patented invention is desirable. See USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies,
Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1107 (1983); see also Kaplow, The
Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1875-78 (1984). Even to
the extent that this is correct, it does not justify use of a patent to facilitate price
discrimination to recover the societal value of a good other than the patented one. If the
non-patented good is a strong complement (much of its societal value comes from use
within the scope of the patent), then control over the non-patented good may be the least-
cost method of controlling the use of the patent.
125. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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exclusive outlet restriction. This section will examine how a court might
analyze these three issues.
126
A. The Closed System
Atari Games has alleged that the closed system violates the antitrust
laws in two ways.127 First, Atari alleges that Nintendo is using the lock-
out system to monopolize the relevant market.128 Second, Atari alleges
that Nintendo has tied the sale of the NES hardware to the purchase of
software produced by Nintendo and its licensees.
129
To succeed in its monopolization claim, Atari must show that
Nintendo has market power, that Nintendo has willfully acquired or
maintained that power, and that Atari has suffered a causal antitrust
injury.130 Of course, prior to resolving the monopolization question,
Atari must establish the market(s) that Nintendo is monopolizing.
For present purposes, we can focus on two markets: the home
videogame market131 and the market for software titles. Nintendo's 75 to
80% market share in each of these two fields should suffice to establish
market power. 132 Also, because Atari is faced with a no-win choice-
either be sued for patent infringement, accept an anticompetitive license,
or do no business at all with 80% of the home videogame market-Atari
has suffered causal injury.
133
Thus, the first and third elements of the monopolization claim are
easily satisfied. Atari's trouble will come in establishing the second
element: willful maintenance of monopoly power. This element is
established if the closed system unreasonably restricts competition in
either the home videogame or the software acquisition market. 134 As
126. Since the case is pending in the Northern District of California, the discussion
focuses to some extent on antitrust decisions from the Ninth Circuit.
127. See Atari's Complaint, supra note 3, at 5-7, 9, 13-14; see also Abramson, supra note 1,
at 24, 27-28.
128. Atari has alleged four relevant markets: (i) the market for base units; (ii) the market
for home videogames; (iii) the market for the manufacturing of NES-compatible
cartridges; and (iv) the market for NES-compatible software. See Atari's Complaint, supra
note 3, at 4-5.
129. Id. at 13-14.
130. See, e.g., Christofferson Dairy, Inc. v. MMM Sales, Inc., 849 F.2d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir.
1988).
131. Atari will need to prove that sales of home videogames constitute a relevant
market. Personal computers, arcade videogames, television, and many other forms of
entertainment may be adequate substitutes for home videogames.
132. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 590 n.8,
596 n.20 (1985) (79.5 to 84.2% of the market sufficient).
133. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 120-21 (1969);
Dairy Foods Inc. v. Dairy Maid Prods. Corp., 297 F.2d 805, 808-09 (7th Cir. 1961).
134. Cf. Christofferson Dairy, Inc., 849 F.2d at 1174.
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discussed previously, a closed system, standing alone, has uncertain
effects on societal wealth.
135
The court will actually need to quantify those economic effects. It
will have to conduct a rule of reason inquiry into the gains and the losses
to societal wealth occasioned by the closed system. Presumably, the court
will then compare the gains and losses and rule accordingly.
136
Atari's second claim is that the lock-out system effectively ties NES
software to NES hardware. Tying describes a situation in which the
purchase of a base unit from Nintendo forces the consumer to accept the
software that Nintendo supplies. 137 While it is extremely unlikely that a
consumer would demand hardware but not demand software to go with
it or vice versa,138 courts have examined closed computer systems as a tie
of two products.
139
A tie can create anticompetitive effects in the following way. A
manufacturer, such as Nintendo, has market power over a product, here
its base unit.140 Nintendo does not fully exploit that market power with
respect to the base unit, but instead uses some part of that market power
135. See supra text accompanying notes 68-75. Despite this, courts have held such
arrangements illegal when the tying product is patented. See, e.g., International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392, 395-396 (1947); International Business Mach. Corp. v. United
States, 298 U.S. 131, 136-38 (1936); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 36 n.4 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136. Or maybe not. Compare Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 605-11 (relying heavily on
intent evidence) with Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1
(1979) (examining economic effects of the alleged violation).
137. But see A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 677 (6th Cir. 1986)
(no tie-in unless tied product bought at the same time as the tying product). The rationale
for this rule seems questionable. The court cites White & White, Inc. v. American Hosp.
Supply Corp., 723 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1983) for support. In White & White, Inc., the court
merely said that the tie had to be a condition of the original sale. 723 F.2d at 506. But a
second sale can be conditioned on the original sale even if the second sale does not take
place at the same time as the original sale. If A sells a tying product to B today on the
condition that B buy the tied product tomorrow, the tie creates the same economic effect
as requiring B to buy the tied product today. See also Kellam Energy, Inc. v. Duncan, 668
F. Supp. 861, 881 (D. Del. 1987) (a requirement that a purchaser of one item also accept a
free option to purchase another is not a purchase of a tied product).
138. To be separate products for antitrust tying purposes, the Court has required that
there be sufficient demand for one product separate from the other product that it would
be efficient to sell the two products separately. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19-22 (1984).
139. See A.I. Root Co., 806 F.2d 673; Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336,
1341-44 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985) (White & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
The original Supreme Court decision that restricted the right of a patent holder to control
unpatented products dealt with a "hardware" maker's attempt to control the "software"
that could be used on its patented hardware. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) (holder of patent on film projector tried to restrict films that
could be shown on its patented projector).
140. Whether the base unit should be considered a separate product market is a difficult
question. See infra text accompanying notes 144-149.
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to induce consumers to accept a tie, buying cartridges from Nintendo and
its licensees. This provides Nintendo with a substantial market share in
cartridges. This market share in the second market, because of the
network monopoly effects of a large library, raises the costs of entry for
potential competitors in the first market and thereby increases and
reinforces Nintendo's market power in the first market.141 More market
power leads to higher prices and more coercive ties that in turn may
generate even more market power. The escalating spiral ends with
Nintendo having a 100% share of both markets, and a library of games so
large that no competitor can challenge its position.
A tying arrangement is illegal per se if: (1) there are two separate
products and to obtain one (the tying product), the consumer must also
agree to purchase the other (the tied product); (2) the seller has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to restrain competition
appreciably in the tied product; and (3) the restraint affects a "not
insubstantial" amount of commerce in the tied product.142 Despite the per
se label, the Ninth Circuit permits a defendant to demonstrate business
justifications for an otherwise per se illegal tie-in.143
Nintendo's 75 to 80% market share, and estimated sales of 50
million cartridges at $25 to $40 per cartridge in 1989 alone, should satisfy
the last two elements required to establish a per se illegal tie-in. However,
Atari will have somewhat more trouble demonstrating the first element.
Ever since IBM unbundled hardware and software in 1969,
hardware and software have been considered two separate markets.
144
But are they? No one buys software except to use with hardware; no one
buys hardware except to run software.1 45 They are complements; both are
necessary inputs to the production of the final good, here an interactive
141. See Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792, 795-96 (1st Cir.
1988).
142. See, e.g., Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 498-500
(1969); A.I. Root Co., 806 F.2d at 675; Digidyne Corp., 734 F.2d at 1338.
143. See, e.g., Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-49
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
144. See, e.g., A.I. Root Co., 806 F.2d at 676; Digidyne Corp., 734 F.2d at 1338-39. But see
Telerate Systems v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 234-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (database and access
terminal are single product because demand for one cannot readily be distinguished from
demand for the other).
145. Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 43-44 (1984) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (question is whether anyone would purchase surgery without also
purchasing anesthesia) (Three other Justices concurred in this approach to the question).
Why isn't the question whether any consumers might buy anesthesia without in-hospital
surgery? If the hospital is attempting to limit the availability of anesthesiologists to
potential competitors, such as out-patient surgery, then the proposed question better
identifies the use of a tie to enhance the market power in the first market, while the court's
question identifies the use of market power simply to gain market power in the second
market.
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videogame.146 Consumers value the end product-the combination of
the two-not one or the other standing alone.
Yet, recent historical practice has been to market hardware and
software separately.' 47 Consumers buy them separately.148 In addition,
as non-fixed ratio inputs, some consumers will want more cartridges for a
given base unit, while others will want fewer. If all that is examined is
the product that consumers are truly purchasing (here, Nintendo
entertainment), then no complements would ever count as separate
markets; products such as gasoline and automobiles would be one
product market. (Does anyone ever buy a car to use without gasoline?)
The relevant differences between anesthesia and game cartridges as
complements are three. First, the demand for anesthesia, while it may
vary depending on the size of the patient and the difficulty of the
operation, is unlikely to be a good predictor of the consumer's reservation
price for the final product (getting well), but the number of game
cartridges purchased may bear a close relation to the consumer's
reservation price for the end product (Nintendo entertainment).
Second, distribution efficiencies are likely to be higher in the case of
anesthesia in that the demand for anesthesia will occur at the same time
and in the same room as the surgery itself; further, the demand for
anesthesia can be roughly determined at the outset, based on the nature
of the surgery and certain physical characteristics of the patient, making a
package sale convenient for both seller and consumer. In contrast,
consumers need not purchase additional game cartridges at the same
time and place that the base unit is bought. At the time the base unit is
purchased, consumers may be unaware of their eventual demand for
game cartridges, making them reluctant to commit to a package purchase
of so many cartridges at the outset.
146. Note that to transfer market power effectively from one to the other and back
again, the products must be complements.
147. This is probably more a result of antitrust litigation filed by the Justice Department
against IBM in the 1960s than any underlying market pressures. The Justice Department
sought to force IBM to sell its hardware and software separately. The Justice Department
felt that competitors to IBM's monopoly in mainframes were more likely to emerge if the
potential competitors could enter the software market first and then jump into hardware
once they had some feel for the business, or alternatively, could enter just the hardware
market, rather than having to enter both at once. That the Justice Department proved to
be wrong (no new competitors for IBM showed up) suggests that closed systems were not
the relevant barrier to entry. See generally Paul, With Dropping of US v. IBM Software
Vendors Brace for Stiffer Competition, Computerworld, Jan. 18, 1982, at 4, col. 1; Scannell,
Economist Sees "Wide Open Door" to Monopolies, Computerworld, Jan. 18, 1982, at 9, col. 1;
Milestones in the US v. IBM Case, Computerworld, Jan. 18, 1982, at 6, col. 1.
148. Cf. Hyde, 466 U.S. at 22-23 (focus on actual marketing practices to determine if
products are separate) (five Justices concurred in this approach to the question); Digidyne
Corp., 734 F.2d at 1339.
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Third, combining surgery and anesthesia may provide efficiencies
to the extent that surgery expertise enables the hospital to select
anesthesiologists more efficiently than could the patient. Nintendo may
also be better than consumers at predicting the value of software because
of its hardware manufacturing know-how. However, this seems less
likely to be true than in the anesthesia case because the value of a
particular game is likely to be much more idiosyncratic than the value of
anesthesia: everyone will want the amount of anesthesia required for the
operation plus some safety margin, whereas not everyone will want
every game cartridge.
How a court should resolve this is far from clear.1 49 But courts,
without really evaluating the issue, have had little trouble treating
hardware and software as two separate product markets.
15
Assuming Atari can convince the court that the base unit and the
cartridges are two separate products, Atari will be able to establish a
violation of the per se rule against tying. Nintendo may still argue a
business justification-that the tie actually increases societal wealth.
151
This business justification defense ensures that the tie has the sort of
adverse impact the tying prohibition is designed to prevent.
152
Nintendo will argue that the tie serves legitimate quality
control/certification functions, and is the least expensive way of
monitoring the quality of the games available for use on the NES.
1 53
Again, this basically turns on a comparison of the gains and losses in
149. Note that the separability question for patent misuse may be different. The Federal
Circuit has suggested that two products are separate for purposes of patent misuse if they
can be patented separately. See Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661, 667-69 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
As discussed above, the Justice Department attacked IBM's bundling of hardware and
software thinking that competition for IBM's mainframe might arise more easily if the
system were open. In this case, even if the NES is a closed system, a company can enter
either the hardware or software market independently. If it were not for the exclusive
outlet restriction, a company could produce only base units and get existing game
publishers to convert their games for use on the new base system. Game publishers can
get their games to market without having to create their own base unit, for example, by
taking a license from Nintendo.
150. See A.I. Root Co. v. Computer/Dynamics, Inc., 806 F.2d 673, 675-77 (6th Cir. 1986);
Digidyne Corp., 734 F.2d at 134143; see also Parts & Elec. Motors, Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc.,
866 F.2d 228, 232-33 (7th Cir. 1988) (replacement parts market is separate from market for
original motors). But see Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 234-36 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (terminals and database are one market).
151. See Mozart Co. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 833 F.2d 1342, 1348-49 (9th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Betaseed, Inc. v. U and I Inc., 681 F.2d 1203, 1220
(9th Cir. 1982).
152. See Hyde, 466 U.S. at 26-28, 4042; Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc.,
858 F.2d 792, 795 (1st Cir. 1988).
153. See Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1348-51.
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societal wealth attributable to the closed system, discussed above,154 that
the court will have to conduct, based on a fairly detailed factual inquiry
(despite the per se label). But by establishing a per se tying violation, Atari
can shift the burden to Nintendo to prove that the closed system
enhances societal wealth.
155
B. The Trademark Restriction
Turning to the requirement that Nintendo's licensees agree, as a
condition of being able to produce NES-compatible games, to market the
cartridges under the Nintendo trademark,156 this restriction will violate
section 2 of the Sherman Act if it unreasonably restrains competition.
157
Again, the practice can be analyzed either under the test for
monopolization or as a tie.
Under the monopolization test, Atari must show that Nintendo has
market power, willfully acquired or maintained, and causal antitrust
injury. 15 8 The relevant market is the purchase of home videogames from
software publishers. The first and third elements are easily satisfied:
Nintendo's market share should be sufficient to establish market
power.159 Furthermore, if the practice actually increases Nintendo
monopoly power in the base unit market (by limiting consumer
recognition of other manufacturers), then Nintendo should have stronger
monopsony power160 in acquiring software titles from companies such as
Atari Games. With more monopsony power, Nintendo is likely to pay
Atari less for Atari's software titles or to impose more severe restrictions
on Atari's ability to undermine Nintendo's market share.
To succeed on its claim, Atari must also prove the second element:
that Nintendo has willfully maintained this market power. This element
requires a showing that the trademark requirement unreasonably restricts
competition in the software acquisition market.161 Nintendo will argue
154. See supra text accompanying notes 68-74.
155. Mozart Co., 833 F.2d at 1349.
156. Nintendo's Complaint, supra note 4, at 2.
157. Cf. Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 46 (7th Cir. 1961) (patent license that
required the licensee to use the patent holder's trademark was a per se illegal tie), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962).
158. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
159. Nintendo's 75-80% market share in home videogames should translate directly
into a 75-80% market share in purchasing home videogames from software publishers.
160. A monopsony exists when there is only one buyer for a given product. Because of
its 70-80% market share in the home videogame market, Nintendo has monopsony power
in acquiring games from software publishers for use on the NES.
161. See, e.g., Christofferson Dairy, Inc. v. MMM Sales, Inc., 849 F.2d 1168, 1174 (9th Cir.
1988).
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that the trademark provides valuable information to consumers and
therefore is procompetitive. 162 On the other side, Atari will point out that
a separate license or a voluntary certification program could provide the
same information and will argue that the mandatory nature of the
restriction suggests that it is most likely a device to minimize consumer
recognition of the trademarks of competitors.
A court will need to balance these two positions and determine if
the likely effect of the mandatory use of Nintendo's trademark is to
increase societal wealth by providing valuable information to the
consumer, or if the restriction is more likely to limit consumer recognition
of potential competitors of Nintendo, thereby increasing Nintendo's
market power.
In terms of a tying analysis, the argument is that Nintendo is using
its monopsony power in acquiring videogames for the home videogame
market to force software publishers to agree to market the resulting
cartridges under the Nintendo trademark.1 63 This creates the harm of
tying in the following manner: by broadening the number of products
carrying the Nintendo trademark, Nintendo increases consumer
recognition of the Nintendo trademark, and thereby decreases the
likelihood that consumers will turn to home videogame products
marketed under other trademarks. Increased consumer recognition of
Nintendo's trademark presumably increases Nintendo's market power in
the home videogame market. More market power in the home
videogame market corresponds directly to more market power in
acquiring software titles (the original tying market) because it gives
Nintendo a bigger share of the market to offer software publishers. With
increased market power in the title acquisition market, Nintendo can
extract additional concessions from its software licensees..
To establish a per se illegal tie, Atari Games must show three
elements: (1) that a consumer is forced to buy one (tied) product before
the consumer can buy another (tying) product; (2) that the seller has
162. For a discussion of the possible gains and losses to societal wealth occasioned by
the restriction, see supra text accompanying notes 77-94.
163. To violate section 3 of the Clayton Act the tied products must be "goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities...." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988); see also
Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 550 F.2d 1207, 1214 (9th Cir. 1977). A tie can violate
section 1 of the Sherman Act as long as the effect of the agreement is to restrain trade. Cf.
United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962) (requiring licensee to take a license to show
bad films in order to obtain a license to show the good films was an illegal tie because it
restrained trade); Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958) (to
purchase or lease land, purchaser had to agree to ship all commodities produced on
Northern Pacific's railroad; held to be an illegal tie). Atari does not allege a violation of
the Clayton Act, but frames its tying claim under section 1 of the Sherman Act. See Atari's
Complaint, supra note 3, at 12-14.
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market power in the tying product; and (3) the tie affects a not
insubstantial amount of commerce in the tied product.1 64 The argument,
as in the hardware-software tie, will focus on the first element: whether
the trademark restriction is separable from the right to produce NES-
compatible videogames.
Nintendo might argue that the trademark identifies the final
product: the interactive videogame. Because the cartridge is a critical
component of that end product, Nintendo must control the quality of the
cartridge and market it under its trademark, so that the consumers
associate the end product with its true source, Nintendo. Thus, the right
to produce NES-compatible videogames and the trademark should not be
considered two products. Nintendo can find support for its position in
the cases that have held that a trademark and the product which is sold
under it are really one product.1 65
These cases generally deal with franchise arrangements where the
trademark is alleged to be the tying product. In each case, the court
examines the nature of the franchise to determine if particular terms of
the franchise agreement are separable from the trademark. For example,
a franchiser might license his trademark on the condition that the
franchisee purchase various supplies from the franchiser. 166 To the extent
that a general rule can be drawn from these somewhat conflicting cases, it
is that a trademark and the tied products are separate if the supply of the
tied products by the franchiser is not essential to the quality of the end
product.167
The question is how to apply this general rule to this case, where the
trademark is not the tying product but the tied product. While the rule
itself provides little direct help, the reasoning behind the rule may. The
courts developed such a rule because of the function of a trademark: to
identify the source of specific goods.168 Thus, when a trademark
164. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v. Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 704 (7th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1018 (1984); California Glazed Prods., Inc. v. Burns & Russell
Co., 708 F.2d 1423, 1429-30 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). But see Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43, 48-49 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
166. See, e.g., California Glazed Prods., Inc., 708 F.2d at 1429 (to obtain license to use
trademark, licensee agreed to buy Spectra-Glaze Compound and other special ingredients
exclusively from the licensor); Siegel, 448 F.2d at 46 (to obtain right to operate under
Chicken Delight trademark, franchisee had to agree to buy certain equipment, packaging
supplies and mixes exclusively from franchiser).
167. Compare California Glazed Prods., Inc., 708 F.2d at 1429 (trademark not separate from
those ingredients critical to the end product, but suggests that the trademark is separate
from non-essential ingredients) with Siegel, 448 F.2d at 49 (trademark and ingredients are
separate products because it was not essential that the ingredients be purchased from the
franchiser).
168. See, e.g., California Glazed Prods., Inc., 708 F.2d at 1427-30; Siegel, 448 F.2d at 48-49.
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identified the franchiser as the source of the key ingredients, the
franchiser could require the franchisee to purchase those ingredients from
the franchiser. An ingredient would be key if it provided the primary
source of value for the product 69
Applying the same underlying purpose for trademarks to this case,
the court should find the trademark and the right to manufacture NES-
compatible videogames to be separable if the trademark does not
properly identify the source of those elements generating the value of the
videogame to the consumer. In this case, Nintendo provides the blank
cartridge.170 The software comes from the publisher. Both contribute a
key element, but as discussed previously, 17' the vast majority of the value
of the product comes from the software rather than the lock-out
mechanism.172 Because the primary value of a cartridge to a consumer is
the software,173 created by the licensee, not Nintendo, the right to publish
NES-compatible games and the trademark should be separate products
for the tying analysis.
Having established a per se illegal tie, the burden shifts to Nintendo
to establish a business justification-that its restriction, despite its
mandatory nature, is really just a source of valuable information for the
consumer. 174 This will be particularly difficult to establish because a
separate license or a voluntary certification could have provided the same
information without the potential for anticompetitive effects.17 5
C. The Exclusive Outlet Restriction
The courts have analyzed exclusive outlet restrictions, in which a
manufacturer agrees to sell through only one retailer in a given
169. Cf. California Glazed Prods., Inc., 708 F.2d at 1429 (the incremental value associated
with Spectra-Glaze blocks came from the Spectra-Glaze Compound and other key
ingredients; therefore, the licensor could require the purchase of these elements from the
licensor).
170. Or at least, it used to. Now it might come instead from Atari Games.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 121-25.
172. Actually, it is the combination of the software and the hardware that create the
value of the NES. The point here is not to apportion the societal value of the end product
between hardware and software, but that the lock-out system is not the source of that
value; with removal of the locking system from both the cartridge and base unit, the game
will play. But if the game software is removed all that remains is a blank screen.
173. Indeed, Atari alleges that consumers have been unaware of the existence of a lock-
out chip. Atari's Complaint, supra note 3, at 6. This seems somewhat unlikely because
most consumers probably realize that some cartridges only play on certain machines, just
as software for the Apple Macintosh does not run on the IBM PC. This allegation may be
factually accurate in that consumers may not realize it is the lock-out system specifically
that renders other cartridges incompatible.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
175. Cf. California Glazed Prods., Inc. v. Burns & Russell Co., 708 F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983) (separate licenses for patent and trademark).
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geographical area, under the rule of reason, because the manufacturer's
interest in most of these cases is consistent with that of the consumer.
176
For a manufacturer without market power, price will be limited by
competition from other brands. This competition requires the
manufacturer to establish a system of distribution that gets the products
to as many customers as possible as efficiently as possible.177 An efficient
distribution system maximizes the manufacturer's ability to compete with
other manufacturers, enhancing interbrand competition.
In some situations, a manufacturer may decide to structure its
distribution system so that there is only one seller of its products in a
given geographical area (an exclusive outlet) to improve its competitive
position against other manufacturers. An exclusive outlet arrangement
can improve competitiveness in two ways.178 First, it eliminates
competition between two retailers who are trying to sell the same product
to the same customers (intrabrand competition). Second, it can eliminate
free-rider effects. 179
A reduction in intrabrand competition can increase interbrand
competitiveness as follows. 180 With intrabrand competition, a consumer
can call ten stores in an area asking for Widget Model 201 and then go to
the store that has the lowest price. This type of competition between
stores selling exactly the same product tends to drive the margin for the
retailer, to a very low level. With interbrand competition, competing
products will be similar but are likely to differ in material ways, so that
consumers can compare the prices and features only on an approximate
basis. Interbrand competition, therefore, does not drive the margins for
the retailer down as uniformly as intrabrand competition. Therefore, by
making a retailer an exclusive outlet in a certain geographic market and
eliminating intrabrand competition, the manufacturer can raise the
176. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 56 & n.24 (1977); see also
Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 725 (1988); Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,44-45 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
177. See, e.g., Business Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. at 725; Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at
52 n.19.
178. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 54-55.
179. Id. Imagine two people, Bill and Paul, who do not like smoking. Bill spends two
years and a substantial amount of money getting the city to pass an ordinance prohibiting
smoking in office buildings. Assuming they work in the same city, both Bill and Paul get
the benefit of the ordinance, but Paul did not have to pay anything for it. (Paul may have
paid for it in one sense. If by not helping Bill, it took longer to pass the ordinance, then
Paul suffered through a smoky work place for that much longer.) Because Paul received
the benefit for free by relying on Bill's efforts, Paul is a free-rider. If there are a large
number of anti-smokers in the city, then each might decide, like Paul, to let the others
spend the time and money to get a non-smoking ordinance passed. The incentives for
each to invest his own resources to obtain the ordinance is reduced by his perception of
the possibility of successfully letting others get the ordinance passed.
180. See id.
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margins for his retailers. Because the retailer makes a little extra income
on each sale, she can be expected to more aggressively market the
product and otherwise invest her efforts as a partner with the
manufacturer.
By limiting free-riding, an exclusive outlet arrangement can increase
the ability of the manufacturer to encourage the retailer to conduct
intensive advertising campaigns or to provide after-sale service, both of
which may be more efficiently provided by the local retailer. 181 Free rider
problems limit a retailer's incentive to perform these functions. For
example, consider the case where one retailer provides extensive
advertising and after-sale service for a product. Another retailer, in the
same geographic area, merely sells the item, advertising only in the
yellow pages. Because the second retailer does not provide these
services, his costs are lower and he can, therefore, sell the product at a
lower price and still make a profit. Consumers might learn of the product
through advertisements paid for by the first retailer and desire to buy the
product. When they call around, they discover the lower price offered by
the second retailer and, therefore, buy the product from the second
retailer. Furthermore, when the product breaks, they turn to the first
retailer to provide service under the manufacturer's warranty. Sales by
the second retailer will cut into the sales of the first, making it
unprofitable for the first to continue advertising and providing after-sale
service. Thus, the second retailer can take advantage of expenditures by
the first retailer to sell more products. If these services are more
efficiently provided by the local retailer, then the manufacturer will use
an exclusive outlet arrangement to eliminate the free-riding and to
encourage the retailer to provide them.
182
Generally speaking, exclusive outlet arrangements are usually
established by a firm because they distribute a manufacturer's products
more efficiently than a system without the exclusive outlet arrangements.
Because they promote competition, courts generally find that they do not
violate the antitrust laws.183 As an exception to this general rule, the
courts have found an exclusive outlet arrangement to be anticompetitive
when the arrangement unreasonably deprives a competitor of access to
the market or to a necessary source of supply'
84
181. See id.
182. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc., 433 U.S. at 55; Bascom Food Prods. Corp. v. Reese
Finer Foods, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 616, 622 n.ll (D.N.J. 1989).
183. See, e.g., Aladdin Oil Co. v. Texaco, 603 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1979); Golden Age
Acceptance Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1979); Daniels v. All Steel
Equip., 590 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1979); Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243
F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
184. See Cherokee Labs. v. Rotary Drilling Servs., 383 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 904 (1968); see also Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Mgmt. Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th
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Given the network monopoly nature 185 of the market for production
rights to videogame software, the exclusive outlet arrangement should be
found to be anticompetitive in this case. The exclusive outlet restriction
limits access to software that Sega and Atari Corporation need for their
game systems to compete with Nintendo's.
In short, the problem is that a software publisher is given an either-
or choice between producing the game for Nintendo with 75 to 80% of the
market, or producing the game for the others. Publishers of a hot game
faced with this choice will most likely choose Nintendo. Atari
Corporation and Sega are left with the not-so-hot games, the older games,
and rough copies of the hot games, not the best weapons for challenging
Nintendo's market position. The exclusive outlet becomes both a direct
barrier to competition today and, by giving the NES the largest library of
games, a source of market power for tomorrow.
Furthermore, the efficiencies usually associated with such vertical
arrangements are absent here. There is no suggestion that Sega and Atari
Corporation have been free-riding on Nintendo's advertising and
warranty service. Nor is there any indication that the software publishers
are sharing their market power with Nintendo to give Nintendo that
extra margin so Nintendo will get out there and market aggressively.
Based on this preliminary analysis, a court should be skeptical of the
need for the exclusive outlet arrangement. But assuming Nintendo can
point to some potential efficiencies, the court will need to weigh these
against the increase in Nintendo's market power likely to result from
denying its competitors access to the hottest games.
IV. A CONSUMER'S PERSPECTIVE
As a consumer, I worry about high prices and poor quality.
Considering the license agreements and the closed nature of the Nintendo
system, I am troubled by three aspects of the arrangement.
First, I am uncertain about the advantages and disadvantages of the
closed system. It may transfer significant consumer surplus from me to
Nintendo, while only marginally reducing the deadweight monopoly
Cir. 1977); Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331 (2nd Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 994 (1953). Cases dealing with exclusive dealing face the same issues
though viewed from the other side in the same way that monopoly and monopsony deal
with the same issues. The cases follow a similar rule. See, e.g., FTC v. Motion Picture
Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953); Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 314 (1949); Standard Fashions Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S.
346 (1922); Oltz v. St. Peter's Community Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1988); cf. Jefferson
Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 45 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Tampa
Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333-35 (1961).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
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losses. Alternatively, the closed system may transfer only a slight amount
of consumer surplus while significantly reducing the deadweight loss by
making the system available to everyone who values it at its marginal
cost or more.
However, I am fairly certain I do not like the two other aspects: the
requirement that all games be marketed under the Nintendo trademark
and the exclusive outlet restriction. By imposing these limitations,
Nintendo appears to be using its market power in the base unit to create
or increase barriers to competitors seeking to enter the base unit market.
Higher barriers will likely create more market power for Nintendo.
Increased market power will likely result in higher prices, either for the
base units or for the cartridges.
Therefore, I would want the court to eliminate the trademark tie and
the exclusive outlet restrictions. I would also want the court to closely
consider whether the closed system serves primarily to transfer consumer
surplus to Nintendo or to eliminate deadweight loss. If the court were to
find that the closed system primarily transfers consumer surplus, then I
would ask the court not to allow Nintendo to enforce the patent,
permitting Atari Games and others to produce and sell functionally
identical blank cartridges.
In response to such a ruling, Nintendo may decide to exploit fully
its market power in the base unit, increasing the price of the base unit by
approximately two hundred dollars. The deadweight losses incurred by
switching from the cartridges to the base unit as the carrier of the
monopoly mark-up may well exceed any short-term economic benefit
from smashing Nintendo's monopoly on compatible cartridges.
Nevertheless, as a consumer, I may prefer the switch for two
reasons. First, with access to all of the titles in Nintendo's library, Atari
Corporation and Sega may become more effective competitors. Their
increased effectiveness may mean that a significant price increase for
Nintendo's base unit may prove unprofitable for Nintendo because
consumers will not pay it. Instead, consumers will switch to the other
systems. Furthermore, while Nintendo's market power may not be
immediately reduced, a more level playing field for competition would
more quickly erode Nintendo's market power than would the current
market conditions. Indeed, under the current market, Nintendo's market
power will most likely increase.
The second reason is more personal. Almost certainly, Nintendo
will not change its pricing structure until after the trial. That gives me a
few months yet (at least) to buy a base unit at current prices. If the quid
pro quo for lower cartridge prices is a much higher base unit price, then I
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will just buy a base unit now and hope for lower cartridge prices come
judgment day.
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APPENDIX
Hypothetical demand, marginal cost, and marginal







The triangular area labelled DWc represents the deadweight loss to
society from the monopolistic pricing; the triangular area labelled LP
represents the profits lost to the seller by monopolistic pricing; and the
rectangular area labelled MP represents the additional profits gained by
the seller by monopolistic pricing. The curve labelled D represents the
demand cuve; the curve labelled MC represents the seller's marginal cost
function; and the curve labelled MR represents the seller's marginal
revenue function. See, e.g., R. BORK, supra note 34, at 101; R. POSNER,
supra note 34, at 10-11.
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Figure 2a
The demand curve is known to match reality only in that Nintendo
expects sales of 8 million units in 1989 at approximately $100 each. See
Lazzareschi, supra note 89, § IV, at 1, col. 3, col. 6; Labyrinth, supra note 6,
at D23, col. 2. Figure 2a assumes that the $100 figure is approximately
marginal cost, and that marginal cost is constant at production quantities
between 0 and 10 million (as shown by the curve labelled MC). The
demand curve represents the value of the base unit to consumers with the
marginal cost of the cartridges removed. Since the demand curve is
hypothetical, each consumer's valuation is reduced by the marginal cost
of the actual number of cartridges that the consumer would buy if the
cartridges were priced at marginal cost. The triangular area between the
demand and marginal cost curves represents the consumer surplus and is
labelled CS in the graph.
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Figure 2b
The curve labelled MR represents Nintendo's marginal revenue function,
the rectangle labelled MP represents Nintendo's monopoly profits from
this scheme, and the trianlge DW represents the deadweight loss to
society from this pricing scheme. The curves were designed so that the
monopoly price was $200 over the competitive price. The $200 increase
represents the approximate present value of the monopoly profits from
the sale of 2.5 cartridges per year for four years to each base unit owner.
See The Kid, supra note 6, at 64 (base units expected to be in 20 million
homes by the end of 1989, 50 million cartridges expected to be sold in
1989). Game cartridges sell for between $25 and $40 each. See Labyrinth,
supra note 6, at D23, col. 2. If the marginal cost of a cartridge is actually
$10, see supra note 64, then the monopoly profit from the sale of a
cartridge is between $15 and $30. Taking an average profit of $22.50, for
2.5 cartridges per year for four years, and discounting to present at an
after-inflation discout rate of 5%, the net present value of the monopoly
profits on the cartridges is $204.32.
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Figure 2c
This figure assumes that Nintendo sells the NES base unit at marginal
cost and charges $20 over marginal cost for each cartridge. The demand
curve assumes that the restrictions on cartridge production do not
increase the value of the end product to the consumer. Arguments that
the restrictions serve a certification or quality control function are
considered in a later section. See supra text accompanying notes 77-94.
The abbreviations are as previously defined for Figures 2a and 2b.
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